Thoughts on the Equinox

Some of the many things on my mind during the first day of spring:

1) State Power vs Social Movements

Evo Morales was swept into the presidency December 18 by an unprecedented wave of popular support. While, judging from the international press coverage and statements made by the Bush administration, you'd assume he's a fiery radical who can count on the unwavering alleigance of the Bolivian left, the truth is of course much more complicated. Evo's party, the MAS, actually occupies a moderate Clintonian center-left position in the Bolivian political spectrum, and is viewed with a mix of disdain and begrudging acceptance by the powerful and radical and huge social movements of this country. The Aymara federations of the altiplano, the miners union, the coca growers and other factions are all keenly aware of the divide between campaign rhetoric and promises and the slow pace of moderate reform several months into the Evo presidency (see #2).

In a country where far more power currently resides in social movements than the state, where the last presidency was toppled by roadblocks and marches on La Paz that could easily be organized again, and where the government's options are severely limited by debt and poverty and significant external factors such as the U.S. war on drugs and the need to attract foreign investment to develop gas fields and other intrastructure, the question is whether Bolivians can find a way to strike a balance between state power and people power that won't topple the Evo presidency before it has a chance to even get started.

Everyone knows that the social movements were the real force behind Evo's victory, and that many on the left voted for him because he seemed to hold out the most promise for change. People see him as though in a trial period now, but the streets are already buzzing with impatience and disappointment, and who knows how long folks will wait before they demand to see results comensurate with campaign promises. With a constitutional assembly process already begun, which many are loudly criticizing as corrupted and insufficiently responsive to the issues most important to the people, no one knows how much slack the left will be willing to give MAS before people take to the streets again. People power got Evo the presidency, and people power may well remove him.

2) Challenges and Compromises of a Populist Presidency

What does it mean to have fought for years as an oppositional force, sometimes even as an underground revolutionary movement against a corrupt government, and suddenly find yourselves in the halls of power, in control of the very government you've been railing against for so long? The difficult task of governing often means making compromises, but what if your campaign was framed as a radical revolutionary movement for change? For those on the left, with an ally and friend as president who's willing to listen and ostensibly shares your vision ang goals, how do you decide when to criticize and when to be quiet, tolerating compromises that may contradict your basic platform or program? Like liberals in the U.S. who sat idly by while Clinton dismantled welfare and passed NAFTA, the left in Bolivia is unsure how vocally it should criticize the new government as it falls short of what was promised and expected.

For Evo, on the other hand, there's the tricky balance between carrying through on basic campaign promises and staying in power. In a global economy, with foreign oil companies jittery about talk of appropriating their Bolivian investments and the IMF and Bush administration holding the purse strings that allow the government to stay solvent, Evo knows he can't fully nationalize gas or legalize coca without a severe and prompt international response, perhaps even clandestine support for a coup or assasination. What, then, should he do? How far should he go towards what the social movements are demanding? Allende nationalized the copper mines and started a radical program of wealth redistribution and look where it got him, not to mention his country for 2o years afterwards. On the other hand, Castro's Cuba, despite the leader's storied longevity, doesn't exactly present a wonderful model of development and poverty alleviation for Evo either. So really, is it better to burn out, or to fade away?

3) Nationalization of Resources in a Globalized Economy

Then there's the whole hornet's nest that is Bolivian gas. With the hemisphere's second largest reserves after Venezuela and gas prices at near-record highs, Bolivia could raise standards of living, build roads and schools, develop infrastructure, etc, with revenue from the sale of gas. Problem is, unlike Venezuela, Bolivia has no state-owned petroleum company, and no equipment of its own, so has to settle for Spanish Repsol-YPF and Brazilian Petrobras to do the heavy lifting. Understandably, the Bolivian people are clamoring for full nationalization of all natural resources, most importantly gas. Bolivia's natural resources belong to the Bolivian people, plain and simple.

Except it's not. Evo can't just kick Repsol and Petrobras out of the country like Iran or Saudi Arabia did decades ago, creating state-owned oil companies that could be leveraged to finance national development programs. For one, in the short-term, who'd be left to run the equipment? Secondly, am more important, these companies would immediately sue Bolivia in international trade court or through WTO mechanisms that protect against appropriation of foreign investment. Bolivia wouldn't just be without the resources or expertise to pump the gas out of the ground, it would be stuck with a multi-billion dollar bill for damages, effectively wrecking the economy and putting all other spending programs on hold, including those for education, health, and public safety, etc. A very bad situation.

In a global economy, with trade rules and international mechanisms in place to protect corporations who operate overseas, it may be effectively impossible for Bolivia to nationalize its gas except in name only... which is what it looks like Evo is doing. 51% of Bolivian gas belongs to Bolivians, and Repsol and Petrobras are invited to form a public-private partnership, with 18% royalties and 32% taxes going to Bolivia's treasury, a better deal than they had beforehand, but still a far cry from the nationalization that was promised, and that a majority of Bolivian citizens are demanding.

4) Federalism vs Regional/State Autonomy

One of the most interesting questions currently facing Bolivia is how much autonomy should be granted to the "departments," or states, and how much central control should be maintained by the national government in La Paz. In Bolivia, state government is practically nonexistent. Local mayors are elected by the people, but "governors" of the departments are chosen by the national government, and departmental revenue all goes straight to La Paz, where it is distributed nationally, according to priorities set by the president.

Bolivia's problem is Santa Cruz. The easternmost department, and the largest, Santa Cruz has most of the gas reserves and a huge percentage of the agriculturally productive land in the country. Santa Cruz's politics are dominated by the wealthy right-wing elite who profit from agribusiness and petroleum, and they want to secede, or at least keep more of the wealth they generate in their own pockets. They're clamoring for a referendum on departmental "autonomy," which it looks like Evo will include in the June elections for the constitutional assembly, a huge concession which will have major repercussions on the state's ability to manage its development. But the reality is that without this concession, Bolivia could well face the prospect of a civil war, and with last year's re-opening of a U.S. airbase 50 miles from the Bolivian border in Paraguay and strategically close to the Santa Cruz gas fields, you can bet which side Bush will support...

Unlike in the U.S., where the conflict on state's rights comes down largely to questions of gay marriage and medicinal marijuana, the Bolivian debate on regional autonomy has grave consequences for the future of the Bolivian state itself. Let's hope they get it right.